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This paper examines the pervasiveness of the effects of U.S. mone-
tary policy regime shifts and unanticipated changes in money on inter-
national financial markets. Four potential regimes from October 1977 to
May 1985 are examined in terms of the response of yen—denominated
securities in the Tokyo market to U.S. money surprises. The rationality
of the responses in domestic and foreign onshore financial markets is
further examined by testing whether the responses of dollar—denominated
securities, yen—dominated securities, the spot yen/dollar exchange rate,
and the forward yen/dollar exchange rate violate covered interest parity.
The use of yen—denominated assets and the yen/dollar exchange rate allows
further tests of the effects of the liberalization of restrictions on
capital mobility in Japan since the late 1970s on market efficiency.
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U.S. Monetary Policy Regimes and U.S.—Japan Financial Relationships
*
V.Vance Roley
Financial markets experienced the effects of at least two major
changes in Federal Reserve monetary policy in recent years. The first
occurred in October 1979 when the Federal Reserve changed from a federal
funds rate (or money market conditions) operating procedure to a nonbor—
rowed reserves operating procedure for the stated purpose of improving
monetary control. The second change is marked by the Federal Reserve's
announced abandonment of the nonborrowed reserves procedure in October
1982, replacing it with the so-called "borrowed reserves" procedure. The
Federal Reserve also indicated that targets for the narrowly—defined
money stock (Ml) would be de—emphasized)' A third potential change in
U.S. monetary—policy regimes coincides with the adoption of the contemp-
oraneous reserve requirements (CRR) system in February 1984. Under the
federal funds rate operating procedure, differences between CRR and lag-
ged reserve requirements (LRR) are inconsequential as monetary policy is
implemented using the demand for money in both systems. Under the non—
borrowed reserves procedure, however, the differences in terms of inter-
est—rate volatility and monetary control are potentially significant.
Depending on the particular form of the borrowed reserves procedure in
effect since October 1982, CRR and LRR also may have different implica-
tions for the behavior of interest rates and the monetary aggregates.
Moreover, the February 1984 change may have coincided with a further
shift in the Federal Reserve's emphasis on its monetary targets.
Empirical estimates of the response of U.S. interest rates to the
Federal Reserve's weekly, money announcements have demonstrated their use-
fulness in both identifying changes in policy regimes and determining—2—
the implications for interest—rate volatility. Roley (1982, 1983) and
Cornell (1983a) provide estimates indicating that the response of inter-
est rates to money announcement surprises increased significantly fol-
lowing the change in policy in October 1979. Recent studies (e.g.,
Gavin and Karamouzis 1984 and Loeys 1985) focusing on the period follow-
ing October 1979 find that the Interest—rate response declined by Octo-
ber 1982 if not before.
Other studies examine the response of foreign exchange rates to
money announcement surprises in an attempt to distinguish between the
two main hypotheses associated with the U.S. interest—rate response (e.g.,
Cornell 1982, Frankel and 1-lardouvelis 1985, and Engel and Frankel 1984).
Under the policy anticipations hypothesis (e.g., Urich and Wachtel 1981),
real U.S. interest rates rise in response to positive money announcement
surprises, leading to an appreciation of the dollar in foreign exchange
markets. Alternatively, under the expected inflation hypothesis (e.g.,
Cornell 1983a), movements in nominal U.S. interest rates reflect changes
In expected inflation, causing the dollar to depreciate. Most of the
evidence from the response of a variety of exchange rates to U.S. money
announcement surprises supports the policy anticipations hypothesis.-'
In addition, different monetary policy regimes are found to significantly
affect the response of at least some foreign exchange rates to money
announcement surprises (e.g., Hardouvelis 1984 and Hakkio and Pearce
1985).
The purpose of this paper Is to examine the pervasiveness of the
effects of U.S. monetary policy regime shifts and unanticipated changes
in money on international financial markets. Husted and Kitchen (1985)
and Hardouvells (1984) provide mixed evidence on the response of yields—3—
on assets denominated in foreign currencies to money announcement surprises,
but then only during the nonborrowed reserves regime. The response of yen—
denominated securities in the Tokyo market is examined here across the four
potential regimes from October 1977 to May 1985. The rationality of the
responses in domestic and foreign financial markets and foreign exchange
markets is further examined by testing whether the responses of dollar—
denominated securities, yen—denominated securities, the spot yen/dollar
exchange rate, and the forward yen/dollar exchange rate violate covered
interest parity. The use of onshore yen—denominated assets and the yen/dol—
lar exchange rate allows further tests of the effects of the liberalization
of restrictions on capital mobility in Japan since the late l970s on market
efficiency.
In the first section, the responses of U.S. interest rates to the
Federal Reserve's weekly Ml announcements are used to identify changes
in U.S. monetary policy regimes. The volatility of interest rates and
foreign exchange rates over different periods also is discussed. The
behavior of the spot yen/dollar exchange rate and a short—term inter-
est rate in Japan are similarly examined in the second section in terms
of the effects of money announcement surprises across U.S. monetary pol-
icy regimes. The effects of the implementation of Japan's Foreign
Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law in December 1980 also are investi-
gated. The third section considers the rationality of the responses of
interest rates and foreign exchange rates in the context of covered inter-
est parity. Further tests examine the information content of money
amiouncement surprises in predicting future spot yen/dollar exchange rates.
The main conclusions are summarized in the final section.—4—
I. Identifying Changes in U.S. Monetary Policy Regimes
On the basis of Federal Reserve policy statements, U.S. mone-
tary policy can potentially be characterized by as many as four dif-
ferent regimes during the past decade. First, since at least the mid
l970s to October 1979, monetary policy was conducted using the federal
funds rate procedure. Second, from October 1979 to October 1982, the
nonborrowed reserves procedure was implemented. Third, from October
1982 to February 1984, the borrowed reserves procedure was used under
lagged reserve requirements. Finally, since February 1984 the borrowed
reserves procedure has been in effect under contemporaneous reserve
requirements.
The effects of the October 1979 change in monetary policy
regimes are well documented with respect to both the sharp rise in U.S.
interest rate volatility and the significant increase in the response
of interest rates to money announcement surprises (e.g., Roley 1982,
1983, and Cornell 1983a). Roley and Walsh (1985) also find that this
change in regimes affected important domestic financial relationships
such as the demand for money.' There is no reason to expect a priori
that the effects of monetary policy regime shifts remain isolated in
domestic financial markets.
To consider initially the potential changes in Federal Reserve
policy regimes, the volatility of the federal funds rate and the 3—month
Treasury bill yield over four different periods is presented in the
first two rows of Table 1. For both interest rates, the reported values
correspond to mean absolute weekly changes measured on days immediately
following the Federal Reserve's weekly money announcement.-' The drama-
tic rise in the volatility of both of these interest rates from the-.5—
pre—October 1979 to the October 1979 —October1982 periods is apparent in
the table. The mean absolute change of the federal funds rate, for example,
increased from 14 to 81 basis points. Following October 1982, the volatil-
ity dropped, but the volatility of the federal funds rate failed to
achieve pre—October 1979 levels. In contrast, the volatility of the 3—month
Treasury bill yield in the two post—October 1982 sub—periods is about the
same as that in the pre—October 1979 period. As a whole, these summary
statistics suggest that U.S. monetary policy changed fundamentally fol-
lowing October 1982. Moreover, on the basis of the behavior of the
federal funds rate, the post—October 1982 regimes are not the same as
that in effect prior to October 1979. In terms of the switch in reserve
requirement systems to CRR in February 1984, the results are inconclu-
sive concerning the significance of this change.
Response of U.S. Interest Rates to Money Announcement Surprises
To evaluate further the significance of potential changes in Fed-
eral Reserve policy since 1977, the responses of the federal funds rate
and the 3—month Treasury bill yield to weekly money announcement sur-
prises are estimated. The federal funds rate is examined due to the
close link between Federal Reserve policy actions and the federal funds
market. The 3—month Treasury bill yield is used in a subsequent section
when the rationality of the response to money announcement surprises
across international financial markets is considered.
Specification and Data. The usual efficient markets model is used to
estimate the response of interest rates to weekly money announcements.
This model may be represented as
zRtb0+b1 UMt+b2 EN+e (1)—6—
where Rt =changein the interest rate over a time interval includ-




=announcedlevei of the money stock in week t
=marketsrational expectation of the announced level of
the money stock in week t
e
=randomerror term uncorrelated with any information avail-
able to the public prior to the money announcement in week t
b0,b1,b2
=estimatedcoefficients.
Under the null hypothesis of market efficiency, both the coefficient on
the expected announced percentage change in money (b2) and the constant
should equal zero.
The data used in estimating both interest rate and later foreign
exchange rate responses to money announcement surprises span the periods
indicated on the top of Table 1. The dates correspond to money announce-
ment days. The first observation is for the money announcement on Octo-
ber 6, 1977, and the final observation occurs on May 30, l985.￿'
The money stock data consist of announced weekly levels of the
narrowly defined money stock, in billions of dollars, as reported in the
Federal Reserve's 11.6 release.-'1 Data for the expected announced level
of the money stock are based on the survey data compiled by Money Market
Services, Inc. The survey data represent the market's expected announced
change inthe money stock. To construct expected levels, market partici-
pants are assumed to expect no revision in the previous week's announced
level.—7—
The survey data are further adjusted to alleviate two potential
problems. First, in the pre—October 1979 period, Grossman (1981) esti-
mates a significant additive bias for the survey data. Second, at times
the survey data were collected several days before the weekly money
announcement. To form an unbiased and inforniationally efficient mea-
sure of expected money, fitted values are taken from estimated equations
of the form
ln Mt_i =
c0+ c1(in M —lnMi) + c2tRTB +
change in the 3—month Treasury bill yield from the first
daily observation following the previous money announce-
ment (Mt_i) to the daily observation just before the
current week's money announcement (Mr)
random error term
estimated coefficients.
The estimation results of equation (2) indicated
ing a statistically significant intercept in the
and an estimate of c1 significantly greater than
ary 1984 period. In addition, the change in the
to the money announcement provided statistically
in the October 1979 —October1982 period. While the revised measure does
not significantly change the estimated responses of interest rates as well
as exchange rates to money announcement surprises, it reduces the statis-
tical significance of expected money in several of the estimated equations..Z!
The yield data are taken from the 11.15 release, published by the








unity in the post—Febru—
Treasury bill yield prior
significant information—8—
measured from 3:30 P.M. on the day of a money announcement to 3:30 P.M.
on the following business day. The change in the federal funds rate is
defined similarly, except that it is a daily—averaged figure. Neverthe-
less, it predominately reflects federal funds trading prior to 3:30 P.M.
Thus, any effect of money announcements ——whichare made at 4:10 P.M. ——
shouldbe reflected in the measured yields.
Empirical Results. Estimation results of the efficient markets model (1)
for the federal funds rate and the 3—month Treasury bill yield over four
sub—periods are presented in Table2.! The estimatedresponse of the
federal funds rate to money announcement surprises suggests the possibility
of several different monetary policy regimes. In the pre—October 1979
period, the response is not statistically significant, as expected under
the federal funds rate operating procedure. In the October 1979 —October
1982 period, the results indicate that the federal funds rate increased 39
basis points in response to a positive 1 percent money announcement sur-
prise. Following Roley and Walsh (1985), this estimated response is con-
sistent with the nonborrowed reserves operating procedure. The estimated
response is once again insignificant in the two post—October 1982 subperiods.
Estimation results for the response of the 3—month Treasury bill
yield to money announcement surprises are similar, with the exception that
the estimated response is statistically significant at the 5 percent level in
three of the four periods. Moreover, the estimated response of 18.8 basis
points to a 1 percent money announcement surprise in the October 1982 —Feb-
ruary 1984 period is over twice that of the pre—October 1979 period. Also
in contrast to the estimation results for the federal funds rate, the coef-
ficient on expected money is statistically significant at the 5 percent—9—
level in the October 1979 —October1982 period. This result appears
to be due to the measurement of the change in the 3—month Treasury bill
yield over a 24—hour period and in many cases over a weekend rather
than the 1½—hour period used by Roley (1983).1 While this result,
along with the presence of statistically significant constant terms in
some regressions, is inconsistent with the efficient markets hypothesis,
it has no affect on the estimated responses to money announcement sur—
prises. In particular, the revised measure used for expected money is
constructed to be orthogonal to the money announcement surprise.
Changes in the interest—rate responses across different monetary
policy regimes are formally tested on the right—hand side of Table 2.-n'
Both the federal funds rate and the 3—month Treasury bill yieldgive simi-
lar qualitative results. In particular, across all four potentialregimes
(Si, S2, S3, and S4), the hypothesis that the responses tomoney announce-
ment surprises are the same can be rejected at the 5 percent significance
level. Moreover, the pre—October 1979 and October 1979 —October1982
periods have significantly different responses. The hypothesis of identi-
cal responses in the October 1979 —October1982 and October 1982 —Febru-
ary 1984 periods also can be rejected at low significance levels. The
estimated responses in the last two sub—periods, however, do not differ
significantly for the Federal funds rate, but they do differ significantly
for the Treasury bill yield. Thus, different monetary policy regimes are
evident in the pre—October 1979, October 1979 —October1982, and post—
October 1982 periods. The empirical results for the Treasury bill yield
also indicate the possibility of a different monetary policy regime begin-
ning in February 1984.—10-
11. Behavior of the Exchange Rate and the Gensaki Rate Acorss Regimes
Hardouvelis (1984) and Hakkio and Pearce (1985) examine the response
of exchange rates to money announcement surprises across different U.S.
monetary policy regimes. As a whole, the evidence suggests that the change
in regimes in October 1979 significantly affected a number of exchange rate
responses. In particular, the dollar experienced larger appreciation in
foreign exchange markets in response to a positive money surprise beginning
in October 1979.
Others investigate the response of Euro—currency rates to money
announcement surprises (e.g., Hardouvelis 1984, and Husted and Kitchen 1985),
but these studies are confined to the October 1979 —October1982 period. As
a consequence, the effects of different U.S. monetary policy regimes have
not been considered. Moreover, the effects of changes in U.S. monetary
policy regimes on foreign onshore security markets have not been examined.
The international effects of U.S. monetary policy regime shifts are
examined below for the yen/dollar exchange rate and the 3—month Gensaki rate,
a repurchase agreement rate in Japan. In addition to the possible effects
eminating from changes in U.S. policy regimes, Japanese markets have been
subjected to varying degrees of deregulation over time. In particular, capi-
tal controls were relaxed in Japan in May 1979 to allow nonresidents to pur-
chase Gensaki assets. Further capital controls were lifted in December 1980
under the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law. This law removed
several important barriers to capital flows in Japan (e.g., Ito 1983, 1984,
and Eken 1984). Additional measures were taken to liberalize international
capital flows throughout 1983 and in April 1984, when the "real demand" prin-
ciple applied to forward exchange transactions by Japanese residences was
abolished along with other changes designed to integrate Japanese financial—11—
markets further (e.g., Eken 1984). Theeffectsof the 1980 law are
examined explicitly below.
Selected sutmuarystatisticsfor the logarithm of the yen/dollar
exchange rate and the Gensaki rate are presented in the third and fifth
rows of Table 1, respectively. Whilethevolatility of the yen/dollar
exchange rate does not exhibit the dramatic swings registered by U.S. inter-
est rates, the pattern is analogous. The exchange rate's volatility
increased in the October 1979 —October1982 period, and then declined in
the two post—October 1982 periods. Similarly, the volatility of the Gensaki
rate increased in the October 1979 —October1982 period, but it then
declined more markedly than the yen/dollar rate following October l982.!'
Response to Money Announcement Surprises
The estimated responses of the spot yen/dollar exchange rate and
the Gensaki rate to U.S. money announcement surprises are reported in
Table 3. The responses are estimated using the sameefficient—markets
model (1) as before. For the yen/dollar exchange rate, this empirical
specification is consistent with the view that most movements in exchange
rates are unanticipated, reflecting the impact of new information (e.g.,
Mussa 1979, Dornbusch 1980, and Frenkel 1981). The change in the yen!
dollar exchange rate is measured from 12:00 Noon, eastern time, on the
day of the money announcement to 12:00 Noon on the subsequent business
day. The change in the Gensaki rate is measured from 3:30 P.M., Tokyo
time, on the day of the money announcement to 3:30 P.M., Tokyo time,on
the next business day.
The estimation results for the yen/dollar rate exhibit the usual
positive relationship over the various sub—periods. In the October 1979 —
October1982 period, f or example, a positive 1 percent money surprise—12—
causes the dollar to appreciate 0.3 percent against the yen. The effect
of money announcement surprises is, however, estimated to be statistic-
ally significant at the 5 percent level only during this period. The
further separation of this period at December 1, 1980 ——corresponding
to the enactment of the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law ——
yieldssignificant responses in both samples, but only at the 10 percent
level. The coefficient on expected money is not statistically signifi-
cant at the 10 percent level in any of the estimated equations.
None of the estimated responses of the Gensaki rate to money
announcement surprises are statistically significant at the 5 percent
level, although the negative response estimated for the October 1979 —
October1982 period is significant at the 10 percent level. This result
is in sharp contrast to those reported by 1-lardouvelis (1984) and Busted
and Kitchen (1985), who report estimate responses that are positive and
statistically significant)hI In the pre—October 1979 period, the effect
of aniticipated money also is estimated to be statistically significant.
To examine the effects of U.S. monetary policy regime shifts, as
well as the effects of the December 1980 law in Japan, the equality of
the responses across periods is tested on the right—hand side of Table 3.
In contrast to the results for U.S. interest rates, the null hypothesis
of equal responses cannot be rejected at low significance levels for the
four monetary policy regimes as a whole, or for pairs of adjacent sub—
periods.' The null hypothesis of equal responses across the October 1979
—December1980 and December 1980 —October1982 periods (S2a, S2b) also
cannot be rejected. As a whole, this evidence suggests that U.S. monetary
policy regime shifts have not had major effects on the yen/dollar exchange—13--
rate and the Gensaki rate. Instead, the main effects appear to be
isolated in U.S. credit markets. However, results using the forward
yen/dollar exchange rate presented in the next section alter this
conclusion substantially.
III.Rationality and the Effects of Money Announcement Surprises
By considering the combined effects of money announcement sur-
prises on dollar—denominated securities, yen—denominated securities,
and exchange rates, the rationality of the reactions can be tested in
terms of whether covered interest parity is violated. In perfect inter-
national financial markets, all profitable arbitrage opportunities will
be exploited across markets. Such real—world factors as transactions
costs, differential taxes, default risk, and political risk could, how-
ever, result in apparent arbitrage opportunities that are not prof it—
able. Nevertheless, in the case of the tests reported below, any major
discrepancies are likely to be due to either capital controls in Japan
or market inefficiency (e.g., Ito 1983). With respect to this later
possibility, evidence presented by Ito (1983, 1984) suggests that the
set of assets examined here satisfies both covered and uncovered inter-
est parity since at least December 1980.
Rusted and Kitchen (1985) also examine whether covered interest
parity is violated in response to the new information provided by U.S.
money announcements over the October 1979 —October1982 period. Using
Euro—currency rates for the U.S., Canada, and Germany, they cannot
reject the restrictions implied by covered interest parity. Again, an
analysis of onshore securities in Japan and the U.S. offers an oppor-
tunity to provide further evidence on the consequences of restrictions—14—
on capital mobility in Japan, or alternatively, market efficiency, by
considering the effects of this one source of economic news.
Covered Interest Parity
As an initial step in considering whether covered interest par-
ity is maintained in response to money announcement surprises, the
response of the 3—month yen/dollar forward premium is estimated in
Table 44-'As before, the dependent variable represents the change in




where YD =logarithmof the 3—month forward yen/dollar
exchange rate.
The empirical results for the response of the forward premium to
money announcement surprises differ from those reported for the spot
exchange rate primarily in that the hypothesis of equal responses across
periods can be rejected at the 5 percent significance level in each case
except for the third and fourth periods. The responses during the Octo-
ber 1979 —December1980 and December 1980 —October1982 subperiods are
of particular interest. In the first of these sub—periods, the estimated
response to a positive 1 percent money announcement surprise is 0.15 per-
centage points, while the response is three times this amount in the lat-
ter sub—period. Also during the December 1980 —October1982 period, the
significantly positive response indicates that the forward yen/dollar
exchange rate actually reacts more than the spot rate, implying further
expected dollar appreciation in response to a positive money announcement
surprise.--" In the other periods, the estimatedresponse is not signif i—
cantly different from zero.—15—
The change in the forward premium is combined with the changes in
the Gensaki rate and the 3—month Treasury bill yield in Table 5 to test
whether the responses violate covered interest parity. In standard tests
of covered interest parity, it is important to measure the forward and spot
exchange rates and the interest rates as closely together as possible. This
follows because such tests typically involve levels of the variables mea-
sured at a particular point in tixne)" In contrast, when testing whether
the responses of these variables to a specific piece of new—information are
consistent with covered interest parity, the exact alignment of the data is
not necessary.
To examine the consequences of data misalignment, consider the
response of the 3—month Treasury bill yield to money announcement surprises
RTBt4:iO —1TBt,3:3O=b1(lnMt4:lO -inMt3:3O)• (4)
Expected money, in M3•30, is adjusted in (2) to reflect information avail-
able at 3:30 P.M. on the day of the announcement. If markets are efficient
in the sense that only new information affects yields, and this information
is reflected immediately by yields, then the yield response should be mea-
sured from 3:30 P.M. to 4:10 P.M., RTB , — RTB .Thedata, how—
t,.-.lO t,3.30
ever, are measured from 3:30 P.M. on the day of the announcement to 3:30 P.M.
on the subsequent business day, RTBt+i3:30 —
RTBt,3:30As a result, the
empirical specification analogous to (1) becomes
RTBt+i3:30 —RTBt3:30
=b1(lnMt4:lO —inM3:30)
+ (RTBt+13:30 —RTBt4.iO). (5)
The term (RTB+i330
—
RTBt4:i0)is the error term in the regression, and
it represents movements in the Treasury bill yield after it has already—16—
adjusted to the money announcement surprise. Under efficient markets, this
change in the Treasury bill yield is uncorrelated with information avail-
able at 4:10 P.M. on day t, such as the money announcement surprise. Thus,
the estimated coefficient b1 is a consistent estimate of the response from
3:30 P.M. to 4:10 P.M., but measurement of the change in the Treasury bill
yield over a shorter interval would result in a more efficient estimate.
Changes in the forward premium and Gensaki rate are measured before
expected money is formed at 3:30 P.M. on day t and after the 4:10 P.M.
announcement on day t. The error term in (1) in these cases has two compon-
ents. One component is analogous to that of the Treasury bill yield. That
is, movements in these variables after 4:10 P.M. on the day of the announce-
ment are included. As before, these movements are uncorrelated with the
money announcement surprise under efficient markets. The other component
represents movements prior to the 3:30 P.M. measurement of expected money.
Because expected money already reflects this information, the money announce-
ment surprise also is uncorrelated with these movements.--' As a conse-
quence, the estimated responses are consistent estimates of the response
from 3:30 P.M. to 4:10 P.M. on the day of the announcement. By combining
the responses of the variables, their consistency with covered interest
parity can be tested. The misalignment of the data does not bias the tests,
but it does potentially reduce their power.
The null hypothesis of covered interest parity corresponds to b1 =0
in Table 5. The single—equation tests reported in the table are asymptotic-
ally equivalent to more elaborate tests across the individual response equa—
tions.-" The results on the top half of the table indicate that the com-
bined responses of the forward premium, the Gensaki rate, and the 3—month—17—
Treasury bill rate lead to rejection of the null hypothesis of covered
interest parity at the 5 percent significance level in all periods prior to
February 1984. The estimation results for the October 1979 —October1982
period, for example, imply that covered interest parity is violated by 69
basis points in response to a 1 percent money announcement surprise. More-
over, the average absolute money announcement surprise is 0.4 percent over
this period, implying that covered interest parity is on average violated
by about 28 basis points. In the latter part of this sub—period (December
1980 —October1982), the analogous magnitude is 33 basis points.
In contrast to these results, covered interest parity cannot be
rejected at the 10 percent significance level for the period beginning in
February 1984. As mentioned previously, it is noteworthy that further
restrictions on forward exchange transactions were lifted in Japan in April
1984. An alternative explanation is that the markets' responses prior to
early 1984 are not rational. Unfortunately, the joint hypotheses of the
effects of restrictions on capital mobility and of market efficiency cannot
be isolated in this empirical framework.
Another possible explanation of these results is that although
covered interest parity is violated, transactions costs make potential arbi-
trage unprofitable)1" Moreover, the estimated effects may predominately
reflect the effects of small money announcement surprises, in which case
the profitable opportunities may be even more limited. To examine this pos-
sibility, money announcement surprises are separated into large and small
categories. The critical value in forming these groups is taken as an abso—
lute value of 0.5 percent.-2" If large divergences from covered interest
parity are arbitraged away, then the coefficient b reported on the bottom
half of Table 5 should iot take values significantly different from zero.—18—
As indicated in the table, however, the hypothesis that covered interest
parity is maintained for large surprises can be rejected at the 5 percent
level for the October 1979 —October1982 and the October 1982 —January
1984 periods. This hypothesis can be rejected at the 10 percent level even
for the post—February 1984 period. While both the magnitude and statisti-
cal significance of the deviations from covered interest parity declined
since early 1984, the results suggest that covered interest parity was not
maintained in response to money announcement surprises in earlier periods.
Future Spot Exchange Rates
The results in Table 5 indicate that the Gensaki —U.S.Treasury
bill interest rate differential and the forward permium responded differ-
ently to money announcement surprises at times, thereby violating covered
interest parity. As a consequence, one or both of these responses may be
irrational in the sense that they do not accurately reflect the information
content of money surprises in forecasting future dollar appreciation or
depreciation against the yen. This characteristic is even more likely since
the responses of the interest—rate differential and the forward premium are
estimated to have opposite signs.
In Table 6, the estimated responses to money announcement surprises
are used to update the implied forward premium forecast of yen/dollar








where YDt+13 is the logarithm of the actual spot yen/dollar rate 3 months
(13 weeks) in the future, the superscripts a and b denote quotes taken
after and before money announcements, and the superscript I denotes
either the response of the Interest—rate differential (d) or the forward—19—
premium(f).These forecasts are compared against the no change fore-
cast (b1 =0),in which the forward premium before the money announcement
is not updated.
The empirical results indicate that the response of the interest—
rate differential improves the forecast of the future spot exchange rate
in the October 1977 —October1979 and post—February 1984 periods, while
the forward premium response is superior in the remaining sub—periods.
That is, one source of information does not dominate the other in terms
of predictive ability across periods. Another interpretation is that the
interest—rate differential responds in the rational direction during some
periods in comparison to the forward premium response, and irrationally
in others. Thus, not only do the earlier results suggest that covered
interest parity does not hold in response to the new information provided
by money announcements over several periods, but neither the response of
the interest—rate differential nor the forward premium uniformly provide
the correct information in predicting future movements in the exchange
rate.
IV. Summary of Conclusions
Several conclusions emerge from this study of the international
effects of money announcement surprises across U.S. monetary policy
regimes. First, four distinct monetary policy regimes were identified
since 1977 corresponding to stated changes in policy in October 1979,
October 1982, and February 1984. Second, while the behavior of the spot
yen/dollar exchange rate and an onshore interest rate in Japan was rela-
tively insensitive to these changes In regimes, the yen/dollar forward
premium exhibited significant changes. Third, until February 1984, covered—20—
interest parity in terms of these assets was violated in response to the
new information provided by U.S. money announcements. In the post—Febru-
ary 1984 period, the evidence more strongly supports covered interest par-
ity. The further elimination of restrictions on forward exchange trans-
actions in Japan in April 1984 appears to be a factor in this case. Fin-
ally, the responses of the yen/dollar forward premium and the Gensaki—Trea—
sury bill interest—rate differential do not uniformly provide the correct
information in terms of actual future spot exchange rate movements. This
behavior may be a consequence of either international capital flow restric-
tions in Japan or market inefficiency.Footnotes
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1. For a description of the borrowed reserves procedure along
with a discussion of the events leading to the change in
monetary policy in October 1982, see Wallich (1984).
2. Roley and Walsh (1985) also reconcile the positive relation-
ship between long—term U.S. interest rates and money announce-
ment surprises with the policy anticipations hypothesis,
while Cornell (1983b) suggests that the magnitude of the
response remains a puzzle.
3. The rise in the volatility of interest rates reduced the
interest elasticity of the demand for money following Walsh
(1984).
4. Other measures of volatility give similar results. In particu-
lar, both the standard deviations of weekly changes and weekly
percentage changes also were calculated. Using the latter mea-
sure for both interest rates, hypotheses that the volatility in
the first and second, second and third, and first and third
subsamples is the same can be rejected at the 5 percent signifi-
cance level in F—tests. See Roley (1986).
5. The usual starting point of September 29, 1977, is not used
here. The available daily data on a short—term interest
rate in the Tokyo market made it necessary to start one week
later.
6. For further details concerning the money stock and interest
rate data, see Roley and Walsh (1985).
7. For further details concerning the revised expected money
measure, see Roley (1983). For a discussion of the relative
merits of this measure, see Hem (1985) and Roley (1985).
8. These results for the first two subsamples differ from those
reported by Roley and Walsh (1985) in that all weekly observa-
tions are used. Roley and Walsh delete observations whenever
other major economic announcements occur during the measured
change in interest rates. The results are, nevertheless, very
similar.9 Falk and Orazem (1985) report that with the unadjusted sur-
vey measure, the statistical significance of expected money
is not sensitive to the interval used to measure the change
in interest rates. Using the revised measure for expected
money, however, this appears not to be the case.
10. To avoid potential problems associated with heterosced—
asticity, the equations in each of the periods are weighted
by the reciprocals of their estimated standard errors in
the tests. The equations also are specified allowing dif-
ferent intercepts, and expected money is dropped.
11. The available daily data for the Gensaki rate begins in
February 1980. Weekly data are available for the entire
sample considered here. In the empirical work reported
below, an alternative short—term deposit rate was used for
the period prior to February 1980. Either using the weekly
change in the Gensaki rate, or starting the second sub—per-
iod in February 1980, had no qualitative effects on the
reported results.
12. This result appears to be robust. Omitting observations
including Federal Reserve discount rate changes, applying
a serial correlation correction procedure, and using a
later initial date for this period to coincide with the
beginning of the daily Gensaki rate series have virtually
no affect on the statistical significance of the response
coefficient.
13. }iakkio and Pearce (1985) reject this null hypothesis at the
5 percent level for the yen/dollar rate over the pre—Octo—
ber 1979 and October 1979 —October1982 periods. Their
methodology differs from that used here in two respects.
First, the change in the exchange rate is measured over a
shorter interval. Second, they use the unadjusted survey
measure for expected money.
14. The response of the forward premium instead of the forward
rate is estimated in part due to the availability of data
for the former variable. It is nevertheless informative to
consider the response of the forward premium since it repre-
sents the relative responses of the forward rate and the
spot rate, and following Mussa (1979), one would expect the
responses to be similar.
15. Husted and Kitchen (1985) also estimate statistically signi—
ficant forward premium responses for other currencies dur-
ing the October 1979 —.October1982 period.16. Proper alignment also is important when daily changes in the
relevant variables are compared as in Cornell and Shapiro (1985).
17. Movements in the variables prior to 3:30 P.M. on day t may be
correlated with expected money in (1). Because expected money
and the money announcement surprise are constructed to be
orthogonal, however, this feature does not bias the estimated
response.
18. Although they consider somewhat different tests, this result
follows from Abel and Mishkin (1983).
19. Frenkel and Levich (1977) and Deardorff (1979) emphasize
the role of transactions costs in tests of covered interest
arbitrage. Otani and Tiwari (1981) and Ito (1983) consider
transactions costs for the set of assets examined here. In
general, the estimates reported in Table 5 are larger than
the estimated transactions costs in these latter studies.
20. As a result of this procedure, about 25 percent of the money
surprises are classified as large. In the October 1979 —
October1982 period, about 30 percent are large by this cri-
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Notes:Volatility is measured by mean absolute changes using one observation per
week corresponding to the most recent daily observation following the
Federal Reserve's weekly money announcement. Data for RFF and RTB are
from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 11.15. Data
for YD, FYD, and RJ are from the international data tape of the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
RFF =federalfunds rate, daily average.
RTB =3-monthTreasury bill coupon—equivalent yield, 3:30 P.M., eastern time.
YD=logarithmof the spot yen/dollar exchange rate, 12:00 Noon, eastern time.
FYD =annualized3—month forward premium defined as 40O(YD—YD),2:00P.M.,
eastern time, where YD also is a 2:00 P.M. rate.
=logarithmof the 3—month forward yen/dollar exchange rate, 2:00 P.M.,
eastern time.
RJ= 3—monthGensaki rate, 3:30 P.M., Tokyo time.Table 2
RESPONSE OF U.S. INTEREST RATES TO MONEY ANNOUNCEMENT SURPRISES
RFFt =b0+ b1 UM + b2' EM+ e
CoefficientEstimates Summary Statistics F—tests Across Regimes
Estimation b b —
Period 1 2 R2 SE DW F(n,m) Periods
Oct. 6, 1977— 0.0053 1.5903—1.9079 —.01 .091.89 53474*Si,S2,S3,S4
Oct. 4, 1979 (Si)(0.0093) (2.1257) (2.2082) (3,392)
Oct. ii, 1979— 0.070839.0666* —7.3739 .09 .642.49 15.3492* Si,S2
Oct. 1, 1982 (S2)(0.0540) (9.3500) (13.4638) (1,257)
Oct. 8, 1982— O.O472** 6.57631.0656 —.01 .201.69 8.1642* S2,S3
Jan. 27, 1984 (S3) (0.0268) (6.5495) (6.2564) (1,221)
Feb. 3, 1984— —0.1068* 10.4846 .ll.797O** .04 .241.51 0.1149 S3,S4






Oct. 6, 1977— 0.0256*7.4061* —3.0893 .08 .101.68 9•3334*Si,S2,S3,S4
Oct. 4, 1979 (Si)(0.0103) (2.3475) (2.4386) (3,392)
Oct. 11, 1979- 0.0708* 33.8377* _16.1662* .21 .371.98 19.3222*Sl,S2
Oct. 1, 1982 (S2)(0.0316) (5.4763) (7.8858) (1,257)
Oct. 8, 1982— 0.005718.8441* —2.1911 .31 .10 1.94 5.4169*S2,S3
Jan. 27, 1984 (S3) (0.0135) (3.3125) (3.1643) (1,221)
Feb. 3, 1984— 0.0068 4.1358 —2.3145 .00 .101.79 8.5795*S3,S4
May 30, 1985 (54) (0.0123) (3.7898) (2.5332) (1,135)
Note: For more complete definitions of RFF and RTB, see Table 1.
*
Significantat the 5 percent level.
**
Significantat the 10 percent level.
LRFF, LRTB =dailychange in the federal funds rate and the 3—month Treasury bill yield,
respectively.
UN =moneyannouncement surprise defined as in M -inMe, where M and Me are the
actual and expected announced levels of the money stock, in billion of dol-
lars (Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, H.6; and
Money Market Services, Inc.).
EM =expectedannounced percentage change of the money stock defined as
lii Me —hiN1.
e =randomerror term.
R2 =multiplecorrelation coefficient corrected for degrees of freedom.
SE =standarderror.
Sl,S2,S3,S4 =sampleperiods 1, 2, 3, and 4.
F(n,m) =F—statisticwith n and m degrees of freedom, respectively.Table 3
RESPONSE OF THE EXCHANGE RATE AND THE GENSAKI RATE TO MONEY ANNOUNCEMENT SURPRISES
LYDt =b0+ b1 + b2 EM + e
CoefficientEstimates Summary StatisticsF—tests Across Regimes
Estimation b b b —2
Period 0 1 2 R SE DW F(n,m) Periods
Oct. 6, 1977— 0.0006 0.0478—0.0092—.02 .006' 1.92 0.7433 Sl,S2,S3,S4
Oct. 4, 1979 (Si) (0.0006) (0.1345) (0.1397) (3,392)
*
Oct. 11, 1979— 0.0008 0.3127—0.2027 .03 .0091.91 2.0836 Sl,S2
Oct. 1, 1982 (S2) (0.0007) (0.1254) (0.1806) (1,257)
Oct. 11, 1979— —0.0017 O.3441** 0.3391 .04 .0082.11
Nov. 24, 1980 (S2a) (0.0012) (0.1764) (0.3499)
* **
Dec. 1, 1980— 0.0019 0.2864—0.3421 .03 .0091.87 0.0541 S2a,S2b
Oct. 1, 1982 (S2b)(0.0009) (0.1726) (0.2108) (1,152)
Oct. 8, 1982— —0.0006 0.2464 0.1715—.00 .0071.50 0.0676 S2,S3
Jan. 27, 1984 (S3)(0.0009) (0.2229) (0.2129) (1,221)
Feb. 3, 1984— 0.0004 0.1261—0.0036—.03 .0062.02 0.1460 S3,S4
May 30, 1985 (S4)(0.0007) (0.2247) (0.1502) (1,135)
RJt =b0+ b11JN + b2.EM +e
Oct.6, 1977— 0.0211* —0.4978_3.0607*.03 .0581.97 0.9487 S1,S2,S3,S4
Oct. 4, 1979 (Si) (0.0059) (1.3429) (1.3950) (3,392)
**
Oct. 11, 1979— —0.0009—2.6636 2.6043 .02 .1011.54 1.1500 S1,S2
Oct. 1, 1982 (S2) (0.0086) (1.4838) (2.1367) (1,257)
**
Oct. ii, 1979— 0.0061—5.1350 7.8315 .04 .1381.63
Nov. 24, 1980 (S2a) (0.0206) (2.9917) (5.9352)
Dec. 1, 1980— —0.0083—0.5412 0.5672—.02 .0681.56 1.9708 S2a,S2b
Oct. 1, 1982 (S2b)(0.0071) (1.3451) (1.6435) (1,152)
Oct. 8, 1982— —0.0042—0.3872 1.2185—.00 .0291.63 1.6495 S2,S3
Jan. 27, 1984 (S3)(0.0039) (0.9603) (0.9173) (1,221)
Feb. 3, 1984— 0.0016 0.0439 0.5318—.00 .0161.91 0.1420 S3,S4
May 30, 1985 (S4)(0.0020) (0.6102) (0.4079) (1,135)
Note: See the notes in Tables 1 and 2.
YD, RJ =dailychange in the yen/dollar exchange rate and the Gensaki rate, respectively.Table 4
RESPONSE OF THE FORWARD PREMIUMTO-MONEY ANNOUNCEMENT SURPRISES
EFYD =b0+ b1 UM +b2EMt + e
Coefficient Estimates Summary Statistics F—tests Across Regimes
Estimation
b b b —
Period 0 1 2 R2 SE DW F(n,m) Periods
* Oct.6, 1977— —0.0414 8.5058 9.2483 .00 .33 2.37 4.9580Sl,S2,S3,S4
Oct. 4, 1979 (Sl) (0.0342) (7.7996)(8.1024) (3,392)
* ** *
Oct.11, 1979— —0.040532.6206 —18.4592 .14 .46 1.85 5.4740 S1,S2
Oct.1, 1982(S2)(0.0385) (6.6666) (9.5998) (1,257)
Oct.11, 1979— 0.059515.2965 —26.6494 .0349 1.80
Nov. 24, 1980 (S2a) (0.0722) (10.4903) (20.8113)
* * ** * Dec.1, 1980— —0.094047.3379 —17.8230.26 .422.02 5.5779S2a,S2b
Oct.1, 1982 (S2b)(0.0440) (8.3622) (10.2176) (1,152)
Oct. 8, 1982— 0.0236 3.6484—3.3221—.01 .15 1.62 12,3121*S2b,S3
Jan. 27, 1984 (S3)(0.0197) (4.8081) (4.5930) (1,221)
Feb. 3, 1984— 0.0111 3.0734—2.8999—.01 .13 1.49 0.0066 S3,S4
May 30, 1985 (S4)(0.0168) (5.1891) (3.4686) (1,135)
Notes: See the notes in Tables 1 and 2.
FYD =dailychange in the forward premium, yen/dollar.Table 5






Coefficient Estimates Summary Statistics
Estimation b
Period 1 1 b2 SE DW
Oct. 6, 1977— —0.036916.4097* 9.2197 .03 .35 2.25
Oct. 4, 1979 (0.0361) (8.2353) (8.5550)
* *
Oct.11, 1979— 0.031269.1219 —— —37.2297 .27 .65 1.88
Oct. 1, 1982 (0.0551) (9.5374) (13.7338)
* *
Oct.11, 1979— 0.1271 53.4494 —— —52.2022 .24 .61 1.82
Nov. 24, 1980 (0.0908) (13.1894) (26.1661)
* *
Dec.1, 1980— —0.015682.4062 —— —34.0687 .30 .67 1.93
Oct. 1, 1982 (0.0704) (13.3783) (16.3465)
*
Oct.8, 1982— 0.033622.8797 —6.7318 .11 .23 1.75
Jan. 27, 1984 (0.0307) (7.5111) (7.1750)
Feb. 3, 1984— 0.0163 7.1653 —5.7461 .01 .19 1.54
May 30, 1985 (0.0233) (7.1946) (4.8091)
LFYD —RJ+LRTB=
b0+b1UM +b UM1 +b2EM +e
*
Oct.6, 1977— —0.036834.2478 9.8551 9.7668 ,04 .35 2.24
Oct. 4, 1979 (0.0360) (15.8453) (9.5992) (8.5346)
* * *
Oct.11, 1979— 0.031073.4414 68.U071 —36.8716 .27 .65 1.88
Oct. 1, 1982 (0.0553) (21.2379) (10.7459) (13.8659)
* *
Oct.11, 1979— 0.131431.4885 58.0877 —54.0819 .24 .61 1.89
Nov. 24, 1980 (0.0913) (31.8158) (14.5816) (26.3822)
* * *
Dec.1, 1980— —0.014698.8541 77.4580 32.6289 .29 .67 1.94
Oct. 1, 1982 (0.0707) (28.1286) (15.3415) (16.5374)
Oct. 8, 1982— 0.036031.7270* 18.4109* 6.3945 .10 .23 1.77
Jan. 27, 1984 (0.0309) (13.0840) (9.2683) (7.2038)
Feb. 3, 1984— 0.0111—6.0070 15.5541**—6.3891 .02 .18 1.47
May 30, 1985 (0.0234) (11.6035) (9.2137) (4.7919)
Notes: See the notes in Tables 1 and 2.
=-" >1.0051,(0.5percent)
= 0,otherwise
UMS= UM,if UN <I .005! = 0,otherwIseTable 6
INFORMATION CONTENT OF MONEY ANNOUNCEMENTSURPRISESIN
PREDICTING FUTUREEXCHANGERATE MOVEMENTS
Forecast UsingEstimated Response of:+
(Difference in RNSE from Baseline Forecast)
Forward PremiumInterest—Rate Differential
Oct. 6, 1977— .0070 —.0064
Oct. 4, 1979
Oct. 11, 1979— —.0221 .0060
Oct. 1, 1982
Oct. 11, 1979— —.0084 .0221
Nov. 24, 1980
Dec. 1, 1980— —.0369 .0290
Oct. 1, 1982
Oct. 8, 1982— —.0009 .0039
Jan. 27, 1984
Feb. 3, 1984— .0002 —.0003
May 30, 1985
Notes: See the notes in Tables 1 and 2.
+Forwardpremium response equals the fitted value of FYD =bUMt +e.
Interest—rate differential response equals the fitted value of tRJt —RTBt
=b +e.
The baseline forecast uses the forward premium before the weekly money announcement. Fore-















Numbers reported in the table correspond to RMSE() —RNSE(E)and RNSE(Cd) —RNSE(E).
YDt+l3 =logarithmof the spot yen/dollar exchange rate 13 weeks (3 months) in the future.
YD =logarithmof the spot yen/dollar exchange rate after the money announcement.
FYD =forwardpremium before the money announcement.
RNSE=root—mean—squareerror.